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in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this
effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of
information, and inefficiency.
JEL Classification: C72, D82
Keywords: Privacy, perception games, signaling games
∗Gradwohl gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF award #1216006. Smorodinsky
gratefully acknowledges the support of ISF grant 2016301, the joint Microsoft-Technion
e-Commerce Lab, Technion VPR grants and the Bernard M. Gordon Center for Systems
Engineering at the Technion. We also thank Eddie Dekel, Jana Friedrichsen, Ehud Kalai, Gil
Kalai, Birendra Rai, Juuso Valimaki and three anonymous reviewers for insightful comments.
†Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA.
Email: r-gradwohl@kellogg.northwestern.edu.
‡Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, The Technion – Israel Institute of
Technology. Email: rann@ie.technion.ac.il.
1 Introduction
The concern for privacy has been a part of the popular debate over the past
century and, with the prevalence of the Internet, even more so over the last
decade. The relentless tracking of our activities, especially those online, puts
forward a variety of new social dilemmas, concerns, and challenges, most of
which fall under the general theme of privacy. In this paper we single out
one such challenge: to understand the effects of individuals’ privacy concerns
on decision making. Can such concerns affect the choices made? Does the
lack of privacy necessarily induce pooling behavior? And does this result in a
loss of social efficiency? To illustrate some of the issues involved, consider the
following stylized example:1
Example 1 Alice holds one of two political views, denoted ℓ(eft) and r(ight),
and can subscribe to one (and only one) of two political blogs, denoted L and R.
Assuming Alice suspects no one is following her, she prefers to follow the blog
that corresponds to her political views. We calibrate utilities so that reading the
“correct” blog is worth 1, while reading the other blog is worth 0. In addition,
Alice wants to maintain her political views concealed but is concerned that what
she reads online may be monitored. This concern is captured by a disutility of
1 in case Alice’s political views are completely exposed and a disutility of 0 if
they are not exposed at all. Which blog should Alice follow?2
Observe the following two claims, which are independent of any reasonable
definition of ‘privacy’: (1) If Alice has a deterministic strategy that separates
her two types (either she is always truthful or always lies), then her type can
1This example is inspired by Example 3.1 in Nissim et al. (2012). Example 2 in the
sequel is a rigorous reformulation of this example.
2One possible interpretation and story for Alice’s concerns is that she does not want her
future boss to know that she is liberal-leaning due to the possible conservative nature of her
future boss, or vice-versa. Given the ambiguity the future holds she prefers that nothing is
learned about her. This interpretation suggests that privacy concerns are a reduced-form
model for some ambiguous future interaction.
1
be fully deduced from her actions. As per our assumptions, this results in
a non-positive utility for either types (note the additional disutility of 1 due
to privacy concerns). (2) If Alice performs the same action for both types
(possibly mixed), then nothing can be inferred from observing the blog she
reads and thus her privacy is not jeopardized and no privacy-related disutility
is incurred.
Is being truthful optimal? Being truthful leads to an award of 1 from the
optimal action, but complete revelation of her political views and thus an ad-
ditional disutility of 1. The total utility is therefore 0. On the other hand,
any mixed type-independent strategy induces no privacy concerns and there-
fore leads to a positive expected utility for both types. Hence, it is superior
to truthfulness. However, any such random behavior cannot be optimal as
in the interim stage, once Alice forms her political views, deviation to the
corresponding optimal blog is both undetectable and profitable.
Through a formal reformulation of this example (see Example 2) we later
show that there are three equilibria in the model, of which truthfulness is
actually one. The other two are pooling equilibria where both types pool on
one of the blogs.
In the example above the individual is concerned with what others can
learn about her type upon observing the action. This is common to a variety
of settings where the action we take may inform others about who we are, what
we like and dislike, what our weaknesses and strengths are, and so on. Thus,
in choosing an action in a world where our actions are tracked, we may account
for what others might learn about us from observing the chosen action. Put
differently, beyond the ‘material’ implication of choosing an action, which is
standard to utilitarian and game theoretic analysis, there is an extra ‘privacy’
consideration from viewing actions as signals that inform others about the
type of the individual. This is the aspect of privacy we study in this paper.
To do so we consider a framework that accounts for privacy concerns by
weaving it into the utility function, the notion of a strategy and the solu-
tion concept: First, an agent’s utility function is comprised of a non-standard
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argument—a distribution over his type set—representing what others think of
him. Second, strategies in our model are pairs composed of type dependent ac-
tions and perceptions, where the latter is a belief associated with each action.
In other words, each type associates to every action a belief over the type set
which he ascribes to other players. Finally, in equilibrium, perceptions must
comply with rationality assumptions.
By adding particular structure to the extended utility function we can use
this new framework to capture privacy concerns. Admittedly, what exactly is
meant by ‘privacy concerns’ is quite elusive. To cope with this ambiguity we
advocate a minimalist approach whereby we draw conclusions while assuming
a minimal structure required for capturing privacy. In this vein, we introduce
two alternative ways for capturing privacy:
• A decision maker is anonymity-seeking if the optimal ex-post belief of
others is equal to their ex-ante belief. In other words, any leakage of
information is harmful.
• A decision maker is identification-averse if full revelation of his type is the
worst possible outcome. In other words, maximal leakage of information
is most harmful, privacy-wise.
With a model of a decision maker at hand we proceed to the analysis of
what comprises an optimal action (subject to rationality arguments). Our
first attempt at this considers a setting with a single decision maker (DM)
who makes a decision in the presence of a passive observer we refer to as Big
Brother (BB). The action taken by DM serves also as a signal to BB about
the type of DM, and so we arrive at a model that is a variant of signaling
games.3 As in signaling games there is an inherent complexity in solving the
DM’s optimization problem due to the cross-dependence between actions and
perceptions. Taking a certain action induces a certain perception, for which
3In the sequel, and especially in Appendix B, we discuss the nuances that separate our
model from the literature on signaling games.
3
the given action might not be optimal. However, resorting to the new optimal
action will change the induced perception, which may, in turn, render the new
action inferior. To capture this interdependence, we consider a variant of sig-
naling games that we call perception games. A solution to a perception game,
rather than being some optimal action, is an equilibrium notion composed of
strategies and perceptions, where optimality and Bayesian consistency both
play a role: given the strategy, the perception must be Bayesian-consistent
with the prior subjective distribution; given the perception, the strategy must
maximize expected utility.
Our contribution The main take-home message is in studying the impli-
cations of privacy concerns on action choice. The most intriguing question
relates to the potential pooling behavior this induces. Thus, for both afore-
mentioned notions of privacy concerns we introduce necessary and sufficient
conditions for pooling behavior. The conditions are somewhat intuitive and
are associated with the existence of a common undominated action—an ac-
tion for which no other action is preferred, independently of perception. Thus,
pooling prevails under a loose definition of privacy concerns.
Does this pooling phenomenon imply that the analysis of a decision prob-
lem is sensitive to the assumption on privacy concerns? In other words, if
privacy concerns are ignored will we arrive at similar conclusions regarding
the DM’s choice of action? Framing this question from the perspective of re-
vealed preferences we ask whether observing non-pooling behavior implies the
absence of privacy concerns. By adding some additional structure on prefer-
ences we show that this conclusion is false. In fact, fully-revealing behavior
may be a result of a “tyranny of the majority”, where the coexistence of a
minority with privacy concerns and a majority that has no such concerns
“forces” the former to nevertheless fully reveal their private information. This
is particularly relevant in light of recent claims made in the public debate over
privacy that, given how much of their private information people voluntarily
share over social networks, they no longer care about privacy (see Section 3.2).
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Finally, we consider the question of whether privacy legislation—in the
form of shielding individual actions from public view—is beneficial to social
welfare. A longstanding critique by economists of such legislation is the poten-
tial damage it causes in terms of social welfare (e.g., Posner, 1978). A typical
example is that hiding credit history necessarily leads to inaccurate risk assess-
ment of lenders and so risky lenders could face (relatively) low interest loans
while confident lenders face high interest rates. Similarly, privacy legislation
of past employment can lead to inefficient matching of employees and firms.
However, this critique ignores the welfare implications derived from the actual
maintenance of privacy. In contrast, we put forward the intuition that if indi-
viduals have privacy concerns then enforcing the secrecy of their actions will
lead to an increase in utility. As the privacy critique mentioned before is a re-
sult of externalities (maintaining one’s privacy may jeopardize someone else’s
utility) it follows that with only one individual privacy legislation increases
welfare. However, with more than a single player this is no longer true. We
show by example that already with two individuals it is possible that a lack
of secrecy actually leads to higher welfare for all individuals, even when those
individuals have privacy concerns.
Overall, we view our contribution as twofold. On the one hand we introduce
of abstract model and solution concept conducive to the study of privacy, and
on the other we discuss privacy and pooling.
Related literature There is a growing literature on privacy in various aca-
demic disciplines, such as law, philosophy, and computer science—see the re-
cent surveys of Solove (2006, 2011), Nissenbaum (2009), and Dwork and Smith
(2010), respectively. Most of this literature does not treat the behavioral im-
plications of privacy but rather discusses the pros and cons of privacy regu-
lation. Similarly, work on privacy in economics, much of which is surveyed
in Hui and Png (2006) and Acquisti et al. (2016), mostly examines the pol-
icy question of how the revelation of individuals’ private information affects
welfare. In particular, privacy is related to knowledge and privacy regulations
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allows the information holder the advantage of leveraging the information to
his best interest. In all these models information available to others is used
in a very concrete way to the benefit of the other, and possibly used against
the information holder whose privacy is analyzed. The players in such models
do not have an inherent concern about privacy but rather view it as a tactical
means for improving their utility. In addition, the individuals have a clear
understanding of the future interaction where such information could be used.
This paper, in contrast, examines privacy through the lens of an individual
decision maker whose concern for privacy is somewhat different. The concern
is either intrinsic, or, as in the above models, it is instrumental, but with
the difference that the decision maker does not have a clear understanding
of how the use of this information will play out in the future. To this end,
our model accounts for privacy directly in the utility function, and studies the
implications of this (we elaborate on this further in Section 4.3). As such, this
paper is methodologically closely related to various strands of the game theory
literature and, in particular, to work on signaling games, psychological games,
and social image.
In a signaling game (see, e.g., Sobel, 2009), an informed player sends a
message to an uninformed player, the latter performs an action, and both
obtain a reward that is a function of the information, the message, and the
action. Single-player perception games are closely related, except that the
uninformed player takes no action but rather forms a belief that is Bayesian-
consistent with the message and strategy of the informed player. However, if
one replaces the belief formation of the uninformed player in our perception
game with a strategic player who is asked to provide a prediction over the
information held by the informed player and will be rewarded according to a
proper scoring rule (see Brier, 1950), then one is back at a signaling game with
a proper mapping of the equilibria.4
4The differences between perception games and signaling games are discussed in Ap-
pendix B. One main difference is that the latter typically assumes that there is some ideal
type of DM whom all wish to emulate, whereas this does not hold in the former.
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Psychological games (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1988; Geanakoplos et al., 1989;
Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009) are games in which the utilities of players
depend not only on all players’ actions, but also on their beliefs about others’
strategy profiles, as well as beliefs over such beliefs, and so on. Psychological
games have been used to model emotions such as surprise, embarrassment, and
guilt, among others. Our paper is similar in that our model involves a decision
maker whose utility depends on more than his action. Unlike psychological
games, our model is rooted in a setting of incomplete information, and our
focus is on the effect of privacy concerns.
Of course, the connection between an individual’s choice of action and
the resulting inferences about the individual’s fundamental traits goes beyond
privacy, and there is a vast literature that examines these other connections.
Research on conspicuous goods, for example, acknowledges that such goods
provide a dual benefit—a direct consumption effect as well as an indirect ef-
fect due to the signal the consumption of these goods send (e.g., an individual
enjoys driving his new hybrid Toyota Prius, as it is a quality car and, in addi-
tion, he is perceived by others as environmentally friendly, which he is happy
about). The literature on conformity similarly studies situations where persis-
tent norms emerge, as opposed to transient ones (fads), in a society where per-
ceptions matter. Finally, the literature on self-image also connects action and
perception.5 One particular paper which connects esteem with privacy poli-
cies (a policy that hides agents’ actions) is that of Daughety and Reinganum
(2010). Daughety and Reinganum’s agent has utility over four terms: type, a
consumption good, her level of provision of a public good (or bad), and an es-
teem term. The esteem term is updated when other agents observe the active
agent’s level of provision of the public good (or bad).
5A very partial and incomplete list of relevant references includes Bernheim (1994),
Glazer and Konrad (1996), and Ireland (1994) on conformity, charity, and status, respec-
tively; Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) on pro-sociality; Becker (1974) and, more recently, Rayo
(2013) and Friedrichsen (2013) on self-image. See the references therein for further related
literature.
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In the context of online advertising De Cornie`re and De Nijs (2016) study
the implications of imposing a privacy policy in the market for targeted adver-
tising. This is done by comparing the market outcome in two scenarios: with
and without imposing a privacy policy. In that work, however, the individuals
whose privacy is protected play no strategic role, whereas in out work we focus
on the strategic implications of privacy concerns.
Privacy concerns are quite different from esteem and issues of self image in
that the latter two typically involve an ordered set of types where all agents
would like to be perceived as ‘high’ types. In particular, agents that have
high types prefer that their type be known. In contrast, our work focuses on
privacy concerns where agents of all types appreciate the anonymity of taking
an action, assuming all else if equal. We elaborate further of the differences
between social image modeling and privacy concerns in Section 4.3.
Repeated games provide a tool for studying privacy policies. One can
study and compare the equilibrium implications between two settings, when
actions at early stages are observed and used to determine players’ action at
later stages vs. the case they are not (say, due to some privacy policy). In the
repeated game setting equilibrium play is different if actions are monitored by
players or not. The roots of this approach and the implications of monitoring
can be traced back to the monumental work of Aumann et al. (1995), who
study an abstract zero-sum setting. In recent years this has been studied
in more specific economic models such as monopolist pricing (Taylor, 2004),
sequential contracting (Calzolari and Pavan, 2006), repeated signaling games
(Chen et al., 2014) and more (we refer the interested reader to a survey of
Mailath and Samuelson (2006)). In this line of work, perceptions play no
direct role in determining a player’s utility, but rather an indirect role through
the stream of future payoffs. The way perceptions play a role in our model
can be interpreted as a reduced-form model of a repeated interaction where
the future evolution of a game is ambiguous, where ambiguity may be with
respect to the nature of the opponents, the possible set of actions, the timing
or the payoff function.
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One paper in which players also have reduced-form preferences for pri-
vacy is that of Cummings et al. (2016), who study the testable implications
of choice data when consumers have such preferences. While related to this
paper, especially to Section 3.2, the work of Cummings et al. is very different
from ours. Most significantly, in their model a consumer’s choices reveal his
preferences, and, unlike in our paper, there is no equilibrium involving the
observer’s inferences and optimal choices given those inferences.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces perception games and states an equilibrium existence result. Section 3
contains our analysis of the effect of privacy concerns on decision-making:
Section 3.1 on the existence of a pooling equilibrium, Section 3.2 on whether
pooling is necessarily implied by privacy concerns, and Section 3.3 on the effect
of privacy concerns on social efficiency. Section 4 concludes.
2 Perception Games
A decision maker (DM) must choose an action from some finite set of possi-
bilities, A. The utility of the DM is derived from his chosen action, his type,
and the beliefs others have of him. The DM’s chosen action is observed by a
second, inactive player, referred to as Big Brother (BB), who forms a belief
over the type set.
Formally, a perception game is a tuple (T,A, β, u), where
• T is a finite type space for the active player (the DM);
• A is a finite action space (for the DM);
• β ∈ ∆(T ) is the prior belief of BB over the set of types; and
• u : T ×A×∆(T )→ R is the utility function of the DM.
The distinguishing feature of this model is the introduction of elements in
∆(T ) as arguments of the utility function. An element in ∆(T ), a distribution
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over the type set T , is the DM’s perception: the belief he ascribes to BB about
his type. See Section 4.1 for comments on this modeling choice.
A strategy of the active player is a vector σ = {σt}t∈T , where σt ∈ ∆(A)
is the mixed strategy of type t. A perception for type t of the active player
is a function τt : A → ∆(T ). That is, for any type t ∈ T and action a ∈ A,
let τt(a) denote the posterior distribution over T following the action a. The
DM’s perception is a vector of perceptions, τ = {τt}t∈T , one for each type.
The expected payoff of the active player at type t, given the perception τt and
the strategy σt ∈ ∆(A), is
U(t, σt, τt) =
∑
a∈A
σt(a) · u(t, a, τt(a)).
2.1 A perception equilibrium
Ignoring perception, the DM’s choice of action is determined by maximizing
his expected utility, for any given type. In particular, the optimal action
for one type would be independent of that of another type. However, when
accounting for perception, this notion of maximization is misleading. To see
this, note that the utility of some action taken by the DM of one type depends
on the belief of BB about the type of DM, updated after seeing the latter’s
action. However, this belief is derived from the possibility that the same action
could have been taken by a different type of the DM, and so there is a clear
externality among types. To capture this we couple optimization and beliefs
into the notion of a perception equilibrium.6
We precede the definition by some notation. Let P (t, a|σ) = β(t) · σt(a)
be the probability that BB assigns to type t and action a, conditional on her
playing the strategy profile σ. Then P (a|σ) =
∑
t∈T P (t, a|σ) is the probability
she assigns to action a. Let Aσ = {∪t˜∈supp(β)supp(σ(t˜))}, where supp(σ(t˜)) is
the set of actions taken by type t˜ under strategy σ. The set Aσ is then the
6The externality across types and our notion of perception equilibrium is analogous to
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in signaling games—see Section B for an explicit comparison
and discussion.
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set of all actions that can possibly be taken by some possible type under σ.
By definition, P (a|σ) > 0 for all actions in Aσ, so P (t|a, σ) =
P (t,a|σ)
P (a|σ)
, the
conditional probability that BB assigns to the DM being of type t upon seeing
action a, is well defined for all a ∈ Aσ.
Definition 1 A strategy–perception pair (σ, τ) is consistent if τt(a) (t¯) = P (t¯|a, σ)
for all t, t¯ ∈ T and a ∈ Aσ.
In words, a player’s strategy–perception pair is consistent if the perception
is derived by Bayes’ rule from the prior and strategy whenever possible.
Definition 2 A perception equilibrium is a consistent strategy–perception pair
(σ, τ) such that σ is a best-reply profile: for every t ∈ T , it holds that U(t, σt, τt) ≥
U(t, σˆ, τt) for all σˆ ∈ ∆(A).
Our modeling choice allows for different types to hold different perceptions.
This flexibility is economically interesting, as different types of DM may have
a different BB in mind. In Example 1, for instance, it may be the case that
a left-leaning Alice has in mind a right-leaning boss whereas the opposite is
true for a right-leaning Alice. Note, however, that despite this flexibility, in
equilibrium perceptions must be consistent with Bayes’ rule, which implies
that perceptions are equal following those actions that are sent with positive
probability. However, off the equilibrium path—following actions which no
type takes with positive probability—perceptions may differ.7
In the Appendix we extend our model beyond the single-player setting.
In the extended version of perception games each player serves as some Big
Brother for other players and, as such, can be one of many types. We consider a
model where each type’s beliefs over others’ types is subjective and we similarly
depart from the common prior assumption. In contrast with the single-player
setting, in the extended setting the Bayesian consistency assumption will not
7This gives the perception equilibrium some flavor of a subjective or self-confirming
equilibrium (see Kalai and Lehrer, 1993; Fudenberg and Levine, 1993).
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reduce ex-post perceptions to be same for all types, even following positive
probability events.
As previously discussed, perception games are a variant of signaling games.
However, although the DM (“sender” in the jargon of signaling games) has
finite type and action spaces, BB (“receiver”) has an infinite action space,
as her belief over DM could be any probability distribution. Thus, it is not
clear whether equilibrium existence results in the literature on signaling games
ensure equilibrium existence here. In fact, to ensure existence we must add
the following technical assumption on the utility function:8
Assumption 1 u : T × A×∆(T )→ R is continuous in the last argument.9
Proposition 1 A perception equilibrium exists in any perception game that
satisfies Assumption 1.
The proof follows from standard arguments and is thus relegated to Ap-
pendix C.
Remark 1 Assumption 1 is necessary for the equilibrium existence result.10
We demonstrate this with an example in Appendix D.
3 Perception and Privacy
Recall that perception games were introduced as a tool to study the implica-
tions of privacy concerns. In the context of privacy one should think of the set
8A further discussion of related equilibrium existence results in signaling games is pro-
vided in Appendix B.
9One must be careful with this seemingly innocuous assumption. Note that if we view
the perception game as a reduced form of some repeated interaction where BB is expected to
take some future action out of a finite set of actions, then this action will change discretely
at certain beliefs, and therefore the DM’s utility will be discontinuous as a function of BB’s
beliefs.
10Furthermore, in Appendix D we show that upper or lower semicontinuity alone are not
sufficient.
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of types as the traits individuals would like to keep private. As an example,
an element t ∈ T can represent the DM’s political views, his attitude towards
risk, his location, his willingness-to-pay for some good, etc.
In order to capture the possible predilection for privacy we proceed by in-
troducing some structure on the utility function u. The study of perceptions in
the literature, either those of society or self-image, typically assume that types
have some natural order and all agents would like to be perceived as (close as
possible to) the ideal type (e.g., benevolent, heroic, generous, romantic, and
so on). In contrast, in the context of privacy an alternative concern about
perceptions comes to mind. Privacy may be thought of as the dis interest of an
individual to have others learn about him. Of course, as already discussed in
the introduction, what exactly is meant by ‘privacy concerns’ is quite elusive.
Hence, we introduce two alternative structures to capture a predilection for
privacy: the DM could be anonymity-seeking or identification-averse.
The first conception of privacy concerns is that agents optimally do not
wish anything to be disclosed about them, beyond what is already known.
This is captured by the following definition:
Definition 3 A DM of type t ∈ T in a perception game (T,A, β, u) is anonymity-
seeking if for every a ∈ A,
β ∈ arg max
µ∈∆(T )
u(t, a, µ).
A DM is anonymity-seeking if he is anonymity-seeking for every type t ∈ T .
In words, anonymity-seeking preferences captures the setting where type
t prefers that nothing be disclosed about his type beyond BB’s initial belief,
and who thus wishes to be perceived as an “average” type.11 For example, an
11A possible critique of an anonymity-seeking preference is that it exhibits some logical
inconsistency in a dynamic setting. Assume a DM faces two consecutive perception games,
and assume that there are strategies for both games such that BB does learn about the DM
in each, but in a way that cancels out. That is, following both games, BB’s perception is back
at its starting point. In the grand game (composed of the two stage games), the DM lands
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employee may wish to keep his political views private from a future employer,
and a consumer of online adult entertainment, even when known to be a
consumer of such entertainment, would prefer to maintain ambiguity over the
preferred specific genre.
A different conception of privacy concerns is that agents do not wish their
true type to be revealed. This is captured in the following definition:
Definition 4 A DM of type t ∈ T in a perception game (T,A, β, u) is identification-
averse if for every a ∈ A,
χ(t) ∈ arg min
µ∈∆(T )
u(t, a, µ),
where χ(t) is the Dirac measure on t. A DM is identification-averse if he is
identification-averse for every type t ∈ T .
Unlike an anonymity-seeking DM, an identification-averse one may benefit
from the leakage of some (correct or incorrect) information to BB. However,
he does not wish his true type to be disclosed. For example, an individual
worried about stalking wishes to keep his location private, and a consumer
contemplating a purchase does not want to disclose his willingness-to-pay.
Note that for both variants of privacy concern the requirement is that the
concern holds for all types. This is necessary for Theorems 2 and 3, which do
not hold if we require privacy concerns for only one type.
We now turn to study the implications of privacy concerns. How do privacy
concerns factor into the choice of action? Does the DM pool actions across
types in order to masquerade his type? Can privacy be detected from revealed
preferences? Is the outcome necessarily inferior compared to the setting where
the actions of the DM are not observed?
the best perception yet in each separate stage he does not. Note that identification-aversion
does not suffer from this inconsistency.
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3.1 Privacy and pooling
We begin the study of privacy and pooling by reformulating Example 1 more
rigorously:
Example 2 Alice is one of two types {ℓ, r}, with a prior β(ℓ) = β(r) = 0.5,
and she must choose between one of two actions {L,R}. The utility of Alice is
given by u(a, t, p) = 1{t=a}−2|p−0.5|, where 1{t=a} is the indicator function for
the event {t = a} and p is the probability assigned to Alice being of type ℓ. One
can easily verify that Alice is both anonymity-seeking and identification-averse.
Consider the pooling decision where Alice reads blog R no matter what her
type is, but believes that if blog L would have been read then BB would think
Alice is of type ℓ. Note that if both types follow this strategy then neither incurs
any disutility due to perceptions. In addition, type r gets a ‘material’ utility of
1, whereas type ℓ gets a ‘material’ utility of 0. More importantly, neither type
has an incentive to deviate, so this defines a perception equilibrium. Symmet-
rically, there exists another perception equilibrium, where actions R and L are
reversed. A third perception equilibrium is one where both types choose their
favorite blog. In this equilibrium both types obtain a utility of 0.12
In fact, the pooling behavior in this concrete example is an instance of a
broader phenomenon. In the following two theorems we describe necessary and
sufficient conditions for full pooling, in which all types take the same action.
The first theorem applies to an anonymity-seeking DM, and the second to an
identification-averse one.
We begin with a definition:
Definition 5 An action a ∈ A is potentially optimal for type t ∈ T if for any
action a′ there exists a pair of beliefs µ, µ′ such that u(t, a, µ) ≥ u(t, a′, µ′). Let
L(t) be the set of actions that are potentially optimal.
12In this example there is no equilibrium in which the DM uses a type-dependent lottery
(in any such strategy profile type ℓ could profitably deviate to always play L and type r
to always play R). However, this need not always be the case, unlike in standard signaling
games.
15
That is, an action a is potentially optimal if there is no other action that is
strictly better for all perceptions. The following theorem provides necessary
and sufficient conditions for full pooling, for an anonymity-seeking DM:13
Theorem 2 For an anonymity-seeking DM, full pooling is an equilibrium if
and only if
⋂
t L(t) 6= ∅.
The intuition underlying Theorem 2 is quite simple: If the condition is
not satisfied then each action is dominated for at least one of the types. A
dominated action is never played, and so full pooling cannot occur on any ac-
tion. Sufficiency of the condition hinges on the flexibility the model regarding
off-equilibrium perceptions. The formal proof follows:
Proof: Let L =
⋂
t L(t) 6= ∅, and suppose first that L 6= ∅. Fix an action
a ∈ L , and for each t ∈ T and a′ ∈ A \ {a} let τa
′
t ∈ ∆(T ) be a distribution
for which u(t, a, τat ) ≥ u(t, a
′, τa
′
t ) for some τ
a
t . Such a τ
a′
t exists since a is
potentially optimal for t. Since the DM is anonymity-seeking, it holds that
u(t, a, β) ≥ u(t, a, τat ) ≥ u(t, a
′, τa
′
t ).
Let us now construct the perception τt that supports action a in a fully
pooling equilibrium: τt(a) = β and τt(a
′) = τa
′
t for all a
′ ∈ A \ {a}. Denoting
by σa the pure strategy a the above yields U(t, σa, τt) ≥ U(t, σ¯, τt) for any
alternative strategy σ¯. Letting σ be the pure strategy for which σ(t) = σa
for all t ∈ T and τ = {τt}t∈T , we obtain (σ, τ) as the desired fully-pooling
equilibrium.
Next, assume L = ∅. Suppose towards a contradiction that there does
exist a fully-pooling equilibrium (σ, τ): for some a ∈ A, the strategy profile σ
satisfies σ(t) = σa for all t ∈ T . Since L = ∅, there exists a type t ∈ T for
13In fact, under a slightly stronger definition of anonymity-seeking—that β be the unique
element of the argmax in Definition 3—the pooling equilibria, when they exist, may have the
additional property that they are not dominated by any other consistent strategy-perception
pair. Such a pooling equilibrium can be constructed by choosing a ∈ L such that for some
type t ∈ T it holds that a ∈ argmaxa′∈A u(t, a′, β). Such an a always exists, and in this
equilibrium type t obtains his strictly highest possible payoff.
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whom a is not potentially optimal. That is, there exists some action a′ 6= a
such that for all pairs of beliefs µ, µ′ it holds that u(t, a, µ) < u(t, a′, µ′).
In particular, this means that u(t, a, β) < u(t, a′, τt(a
′)) (where τt(a
′) is the
perception following action a′ in the alleged equilibrium). Thus, a deviation
to action a′ is profitable for type t, contradicting the assumption that (σ, τ) is
an equilibrium.
Next, we state a similar theorem for an identification-averse DM. Again,
we first need a definition, a variant of Definition 5:
Definition 6 An action a ∈ A is potentially optimal at the extremes for type
t ∈ T if for any action a′ it holds that u(t, a, β) ≥ u(t, a′, χ(t)). Let M(t) be
the set of actions that are potentially optimal at the extremes.
Given this definition, the following theorem provides necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for full pooling, for an identification-averse DM:
Theorem 3 For an identification-averse DM, full pooling is an equilibrium if
and only if
⋂
tM(t) 6= ∅.
The intuition underlying Theorem 3 is similar to that of Theorem 2.
Proof: Let M =
⋂
tM(t) 6= ∅, and suppose first that M 6= ∅. Fix any
action a ∈M, and for each t ∈ T and a′ ∈ A \ {a} let τt(a
′) = χ(t), the Dirac
measure on t. Since the DM is identification-averse, it holds that u(t, a, β) ≥
u(t, a′, χ(t)) = u(t, a′, τt(a
′)). This implies that U(t, σa, τt) ≥ U(t, σ
a′ , τt),
where τt(a) = β. Letting σ be the pure strategy for which σ(t) = σ
a for all
t ∈ T and τ = {τt}t∈T we obtain (σ, τ) as the desired fully-pooling equilibrium.
Next, assume M = ∅. Suppose towards a contradiction that there does
exist a fully-pooling equilibrium (σ, τ): for some a ∈ A, the strategy profile
σ satisfies σ(t) = a for all t ∈ T . Since M = ∅, there exists a type t ∈
T for whom a is not potentially optimal at the extremes. That is, there
exists some action a′ 6= a such that u(t, a, β) < u(t, a′, χ(t)). Furthermore,
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since the DM is identification-averse, u(t, a′, χ(t)) ≤ u(t, a′, µ) for all µ ∈
∆(T ). In particular, this means that u(t, a′, χ(t)) ≤ u(t, a′, τt(a
′)), and so
u(t, a′, β) ≤ u(t, a′, τt(a
′)). Thus, a deviation to action a′ is profitable for type
t, contradicting the assumption that (σ, τ) is an equilibrium.
The pooling phenomena of Theorems 2 and 3, which are possibly inconsis-
tent with material considerations, are reminiscent of pooling phenomena in the
literature on self-image. However, the underlying forces that induce pooling
are slightly different. In the literature on self-image players pool because they
all want to be perceived as some ideal type. In our context an ideal type need
not exist, and pooling is a result of players’ desire not to disclose information
about their type, even if different players agree on which perception is best.
Recall that in Example 2, beyond the pooling equilibria, there is a non-
pooling equilibrium where both types read their optimal blog. This demon-
strates that privacy concerns need not imply pooling, nor do they imply that
the DM will forego an optimal action. This raises the following natural ques-
tion: Can we determine whether or not individuals have privacy concerns from
observing their actions? This question is explored further in Section 3.2.
3.2 Privacy and revealed preferences
The increasing prevalence of social and economic endeavors online has prompted
some to declare that individuals no longer care about privacy. For example,
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has defended a change in Facebook’s pri-
vacy policy—switching the default option for the visibility of posts from pri-
vate to public—by stating that “People have really gotten comfortable not
only sharing more information and different kinds, but more openly and with
more people. That social norm is just something that has evolved over time”
(see, e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2010). In other words, the observed activity in so-
cial networks reflects, according to Zuckerberg, a change in social norms to
a reduction in concerns for privacy. Can this deduction be sustained by our
theory?
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For the rest of this section we will consider a simplified version of our
model, in which utilities are additive: Formally, for each type t, action a, and
perception µ let
u(t, a, µ) = v(t, a)− w(t, µ),
where the first summand is type t’s utility from action a and the second sum-
mand is the privacy loss of that type associated with a perception µ. Fur-
thermore, we will assume that privacy concerns are separable: suppose each
type consists of two elements, an outcome-type and a privacy-type, namely
T = To × Tp. For each type t = (to, tp), we will make two simplifying assump-
tions:
1. The utility from actions depends only on the outcome-type: v(t, a) =
v(t′, a) whenever to = t
′
o;
2. The disutility from perceptions is a function of perceptions over the
outcome-type only: w(t, µ) = w(t, µ′) whenever µ|To = µ
′|To, where µ|To
is the marginal distribution of µ over To.
Finally, for each t ∈ T let at = argmaxa v(t, a), and suppose that at 6= at′
whenever to 6= t
′
o.
In the context of social networks, these assumptions seem reasonable. As
an example, suppose the outcome-type corresponds to the player’s location,
the action corresponds to sharing a location online, and v(t, a) corresponds
to the player’s utility from posting a location and sharing it with his friends
online (what is known as a ‘check-in’ on Facebook). Privacy-types correspond
to the player’s level of concern about possible leakage of his location to other
parties and misuse of this information. Note that players derive utility from
posting their location, but not from posting their level of privacy concern, and
so v depends only on to and a. Additionally, privacy concerns are with respect
to a third party’s perception of the player’s location—that is, his outcome-
type—and not their perception of his level of privacy concern.
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Now, in this simplified setting, Theorems 2 and 3 provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for full pooling. But is full separation, in which each
outcome-type posts a unique location, possible? Obviously, if w ≡ 0 then the
answer is positive, since then each type t will post location at. But what if
players do have privacy concerns?
The following assumption places a lower bound on utilities from optimal
actions. In the social network example, it states that the benefit of posting a
true location online over posting a false one is bounded below by the difference
in privacy loss associated with the true location revealed versus a false location
revealed.
Assumption 2 For each pair of types t = (to, tp) and t
′ = (t′o, t
′
p) with to 6= t
′
o
it holds that v(t, at)−v(t, at′) > w(t, χ(t))−w(t, χ(t
′)), where χ(t) is the Dirac
measure on t.
Note that Assumption 2 is compatible with a DM being both anonymity-
seeking and identification-averse.
A first observation is that under Assumption 2, there exists a separating
equilibrium, in which each type t takes action at. This is related to the similar
observation made in Example 2.
Claim 1 In any perception game satisfying Assumption 2 there exists a per-
ception τ such that (σ, τ) is an equilibrium, and where σ(t) = σat for all t ∈ T .
Proof: For each t ∈ T and a ∈ Amax = {a : ∃t ∈ T s.t. a = at}, let
τt(a) = β|{t:at=a}, where β|{t:at=a} is the distribution β conditional on the type
belonging to the set {t : at = a}. For each t ∈ T and a 6∈ Amax, let τt(a) = χ(t).
It is straightforward to verify that (σ, τ) is consistent.
To see that σ is a best-reply profile, fix some type t and observe that
the utility of type t under (σ, τ) is v(t, at) − w(t, β|{t′:at′=at}). Note also that
w(t, β|{t′:at′=at}) = w(t, χ(t)), since under σ all types taking action at have
the same outcome type to, and the disutility from perceptions is a function of
perceptions over the outcome-type only.
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Now consider a possible deviation of type t from σat to σa, where a 6=
at. If a ∈ Amax then τt(a) = β|{t′:at′=a}. Note that, as above, the disutility
w(t, β|{t′:at′=a}) = w(t, χ(t
′′)), where t′′ is some type for whom at′′ = a. Thus,
under this deviation, t’s utility is v(t, at′′)−w(t, χ(t
′′)). Assumption 2 implies
that this deviation is not profitable. On the other hand, if the deviation σa is
such that a 6∈ Amax then t’s utility under the deviation is v(t, a)− w(t, χ(t)).
However, v(t, at) ≥ v(t, a) and so v(t, at) − w(t, χ(t)) ≥ v(t, a) − w(t, χ(t)),
implying that again the deviation is not profitable. Thus, there is no profitable
deviation, and so σ is a best-reply profile.
So under Assumption 2 there always exists a separating equilibrium, even
if the DM has privacy concerns (he is anonymity-seeking or identification-
averse). What makes Assumption 2 interesting, however, is that it may entail
separation as the unique equilibrium. Suppose |A| = |To|, and so every action
is optimal for some outcome-type. Let t ∈ Tp be a privacy-type who does not
care about perception: formally, w(t, ·) ≡ 0 whenever tp = t. Other privacy-
types may have arbitrary privacy concerns. Let α be the fraction of types
t ∈ T (under the prior β) with tp = t. Then:
Theorem 4 For any perception game satisfying Assumption 2 there exists an
α0 < 1 such that if α ≥ α0 then full separation is the unique equilibrium.
Proof: For each action a, let Ta ⊆ T be the set of types for whom a is the
optimal action, namely Ta = {t ∈ T : at = a}. Let α be large enough so that
Pt′∼β(t
′ ∈ Ta∩ t
′
p = t) > 0 for every a ∈ A: in words, for every action a there is
a positive measure of types who do not care about perception and for whom a
is optimal. This will be true, for example, whenever α > maxa 1− P (t
′ ∈ Ta).
Consider some action profile σ in which types who do not care about per-
ception play optimally, namely σ(t) = σat whenever to = t. For any type t, let
τ ot (a) be the marginal distribution of the perception on action a over To. Let
τ ot (a)
′ denote the probability that τ ot (a) assigns to the event (t
′ ∈ Ta). Then
τ ot (a)
′ =
P (t′ ∈ Ta ∩ t
′
p = t) +
∑
t′:t′∈Ta∩t′p 6=t
P (t′) · σ(t′)(a)
P (t′ ∈ Ta ∩ t′p = t) +
∑
t′:t′p 6=t
P (t′) · σ(t′)(a)
,
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where the probabilities are over the choice of t′ according to the prior β.
Observe that
∑
t′:t′p 6=t
P (t′) = 1 − α, and so as α → 1 both
∑
t′:t′p 6=t
P (t′) → 0
and
∑
t′:t′∈Ta∩t′p 6=t
P (t′) → 0. This implies that the second summand of both
the numerator and denominator in the calculation of τ ot (a)
′ approach 0, and
so τ ot (a)
′ → 1.
For any type t with tp 6= t, the utility at an action a is v(t, a)−w(t, τt(a)).
From continuity, the fact that the disutility from perception depends only
on the perception over the outcome type, and the fact that the probability
assigned to the outcome type being ta approaches 1, it follows that the utility
of type t at action a approaches v(t, a) − w(t, χ(ta, tp)) as α → 1 (for any
tp ∈ Tp). This, together with Assumption 2 that v(t, at)−w(t, χ(t)) > v(t, a
′)−
w(t, χ(ta′ , tp)), implies that for large enough α the unique best reply of type t
is at. Thus, (σ, τ) is the unique equilibrium.
Theorem 4 demonstrates the possibility of a tyranny of a majority that has
no privacy concerns over a minority that does. This is quite interesting as the
right to privacy has always been thought of as an aspect of individual liberty
(this goes all the way back to the English Maxim that one’s home is one’s
castle (Solove, 2006)). This phenomenon is a consequence of the externalities
across types that is intrinsic to the notion of a perception equilibrium. Thus,
one must account for such dangers in the design of institutions for information
sharing, even if participation is voluntary and information is non-verifiable.
Theorem 4 also has interesting implications in the context of a principal-
agent setting. Consider a principal who introduces a mechanism that accounts
for an agent that has no privacy concerns and contemplates the outcome in
its unique separating equilibrium. Can she expect a similar outcome if she
is wrong, and agents possibly have privacy concerns? The theorem suggests
that if privacy concerns exists with a small (but positive) probability she can
expect the same outcome, and hence the mechanism can be considered robust
to a specific perturbation in the privacy hypothesis of the principal.
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3.3 Privacy and social welfare
One common argument made against pro-privacy legislation is that it is detri-
mental to social welfare (see Posner, 1981). Two examples Posner discusses
are that concealing criminal records will lead to an inferior match in the labor
market, and that confidentiality of debtors’ information will distort the credit
market and lead to inefficient interest rates and risky loans. In these exam-
ples, privacy concerns as an intrinsic component of one’s utility, and hence as
a component of social welfare, have been ignored. Perhaps if these concerns
would be accounted for then the conclusion would be that the material welfare
decrease due to such privacy legislation is a worthwhile sacrifice for the benefit
of privacy.
More precisely, suppose one can split total welfare into welfare from actions
and welfare from privacy. Suppose also that the effect of privacy legislation
is that actions are not observed, and so perceptions are fixed at the optimal
β (that is, optimal when types are anonymity-seeking). The argument made
by Posner (1981) and others is that privacy legislation reduces welfare from
actions. However, privacy legislation may increase total welfare if welfare from
privacy makes up the lost welfare from actions.
Our model suggests that privacy legislation may also increase total welfare
by increasing welfare from actions. Recall that in some of the equilibria in
Example 2 types pool and so one type takes an inferior action when actions
are observed. Consider the same example with privacy regulation ensuring
that no one can see the blog that the player reads. Clearly, each type would
then read his optimal blog. So here, privacy legislation would lead to higher
welfare from actions, and leave welfare from privacy unchanged (since types
pool their actions when observed).
In fact, this last point is general: it is quite straightforward to see that
for any one-player perception game, privacy legislation would always (weakly)
increase total welfare whenever players are anonymity-seeking. It (weakly) in-
creases welfare from privacy—since under privacy legislation the DM obtains
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his most-preferred perception—and it also (weakly) increases welfare from ac-
tions, since under privacy legislation each type is free to choose his optimal
action.14
However, this unequivocal benefit of privacy legislation no longer obtains in
settings with more than one player. In the more general setting, it is possible
that privacy legislation would decrease welfare from actions, and leave welfare
from privacy unchanged. As the example that follows will demonstrate, the
lack of privacy legislation may yield higher welfare even if all members of
society have privacy concerns. Thus, the conclusion advocated by Posner
(1981), that privacy legislation decreases total welfare, may hold even if privacy
confers its own intrinsic benefit on individuals, and even if that benefit is
arbitrarily large.
The example is a perception game with two players. The formal model
is provided in Appendix A, which also includes Proposition 2 assuring the
existence of an equilibrium.
Example 3 Consider first the two-player Bayesian game depicted in Figure 1,
in which Nature draws a type profile from {u, d} × {ℓ, r}, and the payoffs
are determined by the realized profile and the players’ actions chosen from
{U,D} × {L,R}:
14Clearly, BB’s utility is ignored in this line of reasoning, and so it does not apply to
Posner’s examples. Those examples are, in fact, two-player games, where BB is the second
player.
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L R
U 5, 5 0, 0
D 0, 0 0, 0
(u, ℓ)
L R
U 5, 3 0, 4
D 0, 0 0, 1
(u, r)
L R
U 3, 5 0, 0
D 4, 0 1, 0
(d, ℓ)
L R
U 3, 3 0, 4
D 4, 0 1, 1
(d, r)
Figure 1: A Bayesian game.
Suppose also that player 1’s (the row player) type is u or d with probability
0.5, and player 2’s (the column player) type is ℓ or r independently with prob-
ability 0.5. In the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game, player 1 of
type u plays U and player 1 of type d plays D, whereas player 2 of type ℓ plays
L and player 2 of type r plays R. This yields the following interim expected
utilities:
type: u d ℓ r
utility: 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Consider now the perception game G = (T,A, u, β), which is based on the
Bayesian game of Figure 1 as follows: The type space T and action space A
are the same as in the Bayesian game, and the beliefs β also correspond to the
same commonly known prior of 0.5 for each type. For each player i, the utility
function is
ui(t1, t2, a1, a2, µi) = vi(t1, t2, a1, a2)− w(µi),
where v(t1, t2, a1, a2) is the utility of player i in the Bayesian game of Figure 1
and w(µi) is a privacy cost that depends only on the belief µi of player −i
about i’s type (and denotes the probability that player −i believes i is of type
ℓ or u). Specifically, fix w(µi) ≥ 0 for all µi ∈ [0, 1], with w(0.5) = 0 and
w(0) = w(1) = 1 + ε for some ε > 0. This corresponds to no privacy cost
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when the posterior belief is 0.5, identical to the prior, and a nonnegative cost
otherwise.
Now consider the strategy profile σ in which σ1(u) = σ1(d) = U and σ2(ℓ) =
σ2(r) = L. Also, fix the perception τ as τ1(U) = τ2(L) = 0.5 and τ1(D) =
τ2(R) = 0. That is, the first pair of equalities is derived by consistency, whereas
the latter equalities state that upon a deviation, the other player believes that
the deviator is of type R or D.
We claim that (σ, τ) is a perception equilibrium. To see this, consider for
example player 1. Her expected utility under σ is 5 under type u and 3 under
type d. Type u clearly has no incentive to deviate. As for type d, a deviation
will lead to a higher v payoff of 4. However, there will now be a privacy cost
of 1 + ε, since the belief of player 2 upon deviation will be 0. Thus, the total
utility will be 4 − 1 − ε < 3, so such a deviation is not profitable. A similar
argument holds for player 2.
Finally, observe that the equilibrium (σ, τ) yields the following interim ex-
pected utilities:
type: u d ℓ r
utility: 5 3 5 3
Thus, even though the game G consisted only of adding privacy costs to the
Bayesian game of Figure 1, the resulting equilibrium yields a strictly higher
utility to both types of both players.
A related analysis of the interplay between social welfare and privacy poli-
cies appears in Daughety and Reinganum (2010). The main conceptual dif-
ference between the two models is that in Daughety and Reinganum’s model
agents do not have privacy concerns but rather are concerned about esteem,
and wish to be perceived as the high type. Nevertheless, privacy policies do
affect behavior in their model, and the effect may both enhance and diminish
welfare.
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4 Concluding Remarks
Privacy concerns of individuals often depend on what the individuals expect
others to learn from their own actions. Thinking about privacy as the interplay
between who the individual really is and what others know (or rather, believe)
about him generates the following circle of reasoning by him: Based on who
I am, I will choose my action, which will then induce others to have a belief
about who I am, which may then compel me to choose a different action. A
perception game captures this circular reasoning and uses a fixed point—a
perception equilibrium—to predict an outcome in such a setting.
Such equilibria, similarly to equilibria in signaling games, induce a full
spectrum of privacy-related outcomes. At the extremes, they may be com-
pletely pooling, and hence others learn nothing about the individual and his
privacy is kept intact, or they can be fully separating, in which case privacy is
completely jeopardized.
Perception games provide a framework for the formal analysis of strategic
settings in which actions and perceptions both play a role. Thus, they provide
a unified framework for studying interactions among strategic players who care
about the way others perceive them, which goes well beyond privacy concerns.
In particular, perception games generalize models that have been used in the
literature on social image and conspicuous consumption.
In this paper we restricted attention to a relatively simple class of percep-
tion games, where players’ utilities depend on perceptions of their types but do
not take perceptions over perceptions into account (in contrast to psychologi-
cal games, where utilities may depend on a full hierarchy of beliefs). We also
limited ourselves to a static, one-shot setting. We hope to study extensions of
these restrictions in future work.
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4.1 Modeling privacy and optimal actions
Our modeling choices—that only perceptions matter, that the setting is static,
and that privacy concerns are a direct argument of the utility function—are
partially made for tractability, but additionally have some motivation in the
context of privacy. Let us first pause to think about the nature of privacy
concerns. What is it that individuals do not want others to know, and why?
It seems that such concerns arise at three different levels:
• An embarrassment derived directly from others observing one’s actions,
even if that sheds no new light on how the individual is perceived. For
example, privacy is important in public restrooms in many Western so-
cieties, and many people feel awkward if others watch them in the act.15
• A concern about revealing private information that can lead others to
have the upper hand in some future (specified or unspecified) interac-
tion. For example, concealing one’s juvenile crime record is important
for securing the impartiality of future potential employers.
• A concern about inferences others might make about an individual by
observing his actions. Such inferences might relate to various aspects of
his personality, such as his attitude towards risk, altruism, consumption
preferences, etc. For example, in certain countries, men, who might oth-
erwise appreciate the comfort of a skirt, may not wear skirts in public
due to concerns regarding what people would deduce about their mas-
culinity.16
15Similarly, although it is commonly assumed that consumption of adult entertainment
is very widely spread, most consumers would feel uncomfortable if observed in the act of
consumption (see Edelman, 2009).
16Some argue that the fundamental concern that is captured by this argument is in fact
a proxy for concerns that are related to future payoffs in some unknown future interaction.
Hence, the distinction between this argument and the previous one may boil down to how
carefully the individual models his future interactions.
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In the standard economic and game-theoretic modeling paradigm, these
three levels of concern translate to:
• Disutility from others observing one’s actions, which can be encoded into
the utility function. This can be modeled in the context of a simple game
with complete information.
• The strategic options available to others in the future due to finer in-
formation. This can be captured in a model of a repeated game (as in
Mailath and Samuelson, 2006).
• What others learn about one’s type, which can be captured in a model
of incomplete information.
In this paper we study how privacy concerns impact individuals’ decisions.
In particular, our work is motivated by the two last levels of concern men-
tioned above. Our utility function in a single shot game, which accounts for
perceptions, can be thought of as a reduced-form analysis of a repeated game
whenever future interactions (future stage games) are ambiguous and will take
different forms in different circumstances. In that case players have no clear
structure of the repeated game and reduce the implications of choosing one
action or another to its effect on the perception. Another interpretation of
the model is in the context of the last level above. Thinking of our model in
that context captures the abstract idea that privacy, interpreted as the lack of
additional information on one’s type, is intrinsically important to the DM.
4.2 Who is Big Brother?
The passive player, BB, should be thought of in one of two ways. He may
either be a real player, or, alternatively, he can merely be a figment of the
DM’s imagination. Technically this distinction has no bite, but conceptually
it matters. The former interpretation sits well with our motivation for the
model as a reduced-form model for some elaborate setting where BB takes
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future actions that are material to the DM. However, given the vagueness of
how the information will be used, which course of action (or actions) will be
taken, and how this will actually impact the DM’s utility, one folds all of this
into a perception of BB over the type of DM. In technical terms, the perception
is a sufficient statistic for the future evolution of the game.
The latter interpretation is more in line with a different view of what
privacy concerns are all about. In this case one should think of privacy not
as a means for getting future benefits but rather as a virtue that underpins
human dignity and freedom. In this case, what the DM finds unsettling is the
fact that his type is exposed and so people can learn who he is.
4.3 Modeling esteem vs. modeling privacy
As discussed in the introduction the general approach underlying perception
games, and specifically our modeling choice for capturing privacy concerns, is
closely related to the literature on social image and conspicuous consumption.
In both cases a player’s utility depends, inter alia, on how he is perceived.
However, a few distinctions are worth noting:
• In our setting the DM does not want others to learn anything about his
type. Compare this with the literature where in all models (as far as
we know) there is always some ‘ideal’ type (or more generally, types are
ordered) and all players, independently of their type, would like to be
perceived to be as close as possible to the ideal type.17 Furthermore,
this notion of an ideal type is the same for all agents.18 In fact, if others
learn that the DM’s type is an ideal one then he is happy with that. This
renders types that are close to ideal as averse to privacy in our sense,
and is quite different from our notions of privacy and identity concerns.
17The ‘ideal’ type may be referred to as the benevolent type, the wealthy type, the altru-
istic type, the bold type, etc.
18The recent work of Friedrichsen (2013) departs from this strong homogeneity assump-
tion.
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• A technical distinction worth noting is that in our general model of
perception games, perceptions are captured by distributions over types.
However, in most models on social image, the type set is modeled as an
interval on the real line and a perception is simply captured by a single
type (and not a distribution). This is not a limiting issue in the con-
text of a separating equilibrium. On the other hand, the primitive we
allude to is the distribution over beliefs, and we do not restrict the dis-
cussion to utility functions which treat similarly all beliefs with the same
expectation. To demonstrate the limit of the ‘expected type’ approach
consider the imposed equivalence between the following two scenarios:
(1) Big Brother does not know what one’s political views are and as-
signs a uniform probability to any of the views on the interval spanning
from extreme left to extreme right, and (2) Big Brother is confident the
individual is an extremist, either left or right, and assigns each of these
cases a probability of 0.5.
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Appendix
A Two-Player Perception Games
A two-player perception game is a tuple (Ti, Ai, βi, ui)
2
i=1 defined as follows.
For each player i ∈ {1, 2},
• Ti is a finite type space,
• Ai is a finite action space,
• ui : Ti × T−i ×Ai ×A−i ×∆(Ti)→ R.
• βi : Ti → ∆(T−i) is a belief for player i.
Note that the two-player perception game reduces to our initial model
of a perception game, hereinafter known as a single-player perception game,
whenever T2 and A2 are singleton sets.
Similarly to the single-player perception game, a strategy for player i is
a function σi : Ti → ∆(Ai). A perception for player i is a function τi :
Ti × T−i × Ai → ∆(Ti), which represents what i believes −i’s belief (of some
type t−i) is over i’s own type.
Given a tuple (βi, τi)
2
i=1, the expected payoff to player i, of a given type
ti when players use strategies (σj)
2
j=1, is Ui((σj)
2
j=1, βi, τi)(ti) (also denoted
Ui((σj)
2
j=1, τi)(ti) or Ui((σj)
2
j=1)(ti) when the beliefs and perceptions are clear),
computed as follows:
Ui((σj)
2
j=1)(ti)
=
∑
a∈Ai,t−i∈T−i,b∈A−i
σi(ti)(a) · βi(ti)(t−i) · σ−i(t−i)(b) · ui(ti, t−i, a, b, τi(ti, t−i, a)).
Let us consider the perceptions of player i were she aware of the beliefs
of player −i. Let Pti(t−i, b) = βi(ti)(t−i) · σ−i(t−i)(b) be the probability that
i, of type ti, assigns to −i being of type t−i and to this type performing the
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action b. Thus, Pti(b) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i, b) is the probability she assigns to −i
performing the action b and Pti(t−i|b) =
Pti(t−i,b)
Pti(b)
(where 0
0
is interpreted as 0)
is the conditional probability that i, of type ti, assigns to −i being of type t−i
upon seeing the action b of −i. Symmetrically, let Pt−i(t¯i|a) be the conditional
probability that −i, of type t−i, assigns to i being of type t¯i upon seeing the
action a of i.
Player i is consistent if for all t−i, ti, and a ∈ ∪t˜i∈supp(β−i(t−i))supp(σi(t˜i)),
it holds that τi(ti, t−i, a)(t¯i) = Pt−i(t¯i|a) for all t¯i. In words, the ex post
perception of one player over the type of the other player must be Bayesian
consistent.
Definition 7 A perception equilibrium is a tuple (σi, τi)
2
i=1 such that both
players are consistent and for any i and ti ∈ Ti, the strategy σi is a best reply:
Ui((σi)
2
i=1)(ti) ≥ Ui(σˆi, σ−i)(ti) ∀σˆi : Ti → ∆(Ai).
As with the single-player perception game, we assume continuity in the
last argument of the utility function:
Assumption 3 For each i, the utility function ui : Ti × T−i × Ai × A−i ×
∆(Ti)→ R is continuous in the last argument.
Proposition 2 A perception equilibrium exists in every two-player perception
game that satisfies Assumption 3.
B Perception games as a variant of signaling
games
As suggested in the introduction, perception games are a variant of signaling
games. The initial analogy is that of a signaling game played between two
players, with the DM serving as a sender and BB serving as a receiver whose
utility is determined by a proper scoring rule. Let us examine this analogy
and its implication for equilibrium existence.
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In a signaling game the receiver has one single belief in each of his in-
formation sets. In particular, as the receiver does not know the type of the
sender the model dictates that the receiver’s belief is independent of the type
of the sender. In our setting this is not required but is an outcome of the
equilibrium concept, and even then holds only for non-zero probability events.
Specifically, off the equilibrium path different types of sender (DM) may have
different perceptions.
Thus, in order to take the exercise of embedding perception games within
the framework of signaling games we must go beyond a single sender and a sin-
gle receiver game. The correct model is one of a signaling game with multiple
receivers, one for each type of the sender. The sender of type t sends a single
message to T receivers and only cares about the “action” of receiver t. The per-
ception associated with type t of the DM in a perception game corresponds to
the belief of receiver t in the signaling game. Both perception equilibria and
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) require that perceptions/beliefs be “cor-
rect” in equilibrium, i.e., on the equilibrium path, and this is the consistency
requirement in both perception equilibria and in the PBE of the corresponding
signaling game. Thus, the PBE of the resulting signaling game will perfectly
match up with a perception equilibrium of the original perception game. Note
that in such a multi-receiver signaling game the diversity of off-equilibrium
perceptions sits well with the interpretation of BB as a real player (or play-
ers).
Next, one can ask whether this implies the equilibrium existence result. To
the best of our understanding it does not. The reason is that the resulting
signaling game is not a finite game, since the receiver has an infinite (though
compact) action space: the set of all probability distributions over sender
types. We were not able to find general existence results for PBE in this class
of games, and in fact Manelli (1996a) demonstrates a signaling game with no
PBE.19
19Theorem 1 in Manelli (1996b) provides an existence result for the special case of binary
sender types. It does not extend beyond binary types as it assumes that the action set of
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C Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
The proof, not surprisingly, hinges on Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem. As
usual, this involves defining an appropriate best-response correspondence, show-
ing that it is upper-hemicontinuous and convex-valued, and then invoking
Kakutani’s theorem. The crux of our proof lies in fixing the perception τ as a
function of the strategy, such that the induced best-response correspondence is
indeed upper-hemicontinuous. More specifically, in defining the best-response
correspondence we construct a particular consistent τσ for each strategy profile
σ in the domain, for which we find the set of best-responses.
We will prove Proposition 2. Proposition 1 is simply a corollary, with
|T2| = |A2| = 1.
Fix a perception game (Ti, Ai, βi, ui)
2
i=1, a strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2), a
player i ∈ {1, 2}, and a type t ∈ Ti of player i.
20 Let T σt be the set of all
perceptions for type t that are consistent given σ. Formally,
T σt = {τi : Ti × T−i × Ai → ∆(Ti) : τi(t, t−i, a)(t¯) = Pt−i(t¯|a)
∀t¯ ∈ Ti, ∀t−i ∈ T−i, ∀a ∈ ∪t˜i∈supp(β−i(t−i))supp(σi(t˜i))}.
Let Bσt ⊆ A be defined as follows:
Bσt = {a ∈ Ai : ∃µi ∈ T
σ
t s.t. Ui(σ
a
i , σ−i, βi, µi)(t) ≥ Ui(σ
a′ , σ−iβi, µi)(t) ∀a
′ ∈ A},
where σai is the pure strategy of player i that puts weight 1 on the action a.
Bσt consists of all actions a ∈ Ai that are weakly optimal for a player i of type
t for some consistent perception of type t. In particular, any a 6∈ Bσt is never
optimal as long as perceptions are consistent.
Claim 2 There exists τσt ∈ T
σ
t for which Ui(σ
a, σi, βi, τ
σ
t )(t) = Ui(σ
a′ , σi, βi, τ
σ
t )(t)
for all a, a′ ∈ Bσt .
the receiver is a real number, which can correspond to a probability in the binary case but
not to distributions over more than two actions.
20We use t ∈ Ti rather than ti to slightly shorten notation.
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Proof: Assumption 1 implies that for any a ∈ Bσt , the set U
a
i
def
={Ui(σ
a, σi, βi, µi)(t) :
µi ∈ T
σ
t } is a closed interval in R. Furthermore, by the construction of B
σ
t ,
the pairwise intersection Uai ∩ U
a′
i 6= ∅ for any a, a
′ ∈ Bσt . Thus, the inter-
section of all such intervals is nonempty. Let p ∈ R denote some point in the
intersection of all of the intervals. For each a ∈ Bσt , this point is attained at
some µa = µa(t, t−i, a) ∈ T
σ
t , so
p = Ui(σ
a, σ−i, βi, µ
a)(t)
∑
t−i∈T−i,b∈A−i
βi(t)(t−i) · σ−i(t−i)(b) · ui(t, t−i, a, b, µ
a(t, t−i, a)).
Define τσt as τ
σ
t (t, t−i, a)
def
= µa(t, t−i, a) for every t−i ∈ T−i and a ∈ Ai, and
note that τσt ∈ T
σ
t as well. Then for each a ∈ B
σ
t it holds that
Ui(σ
a, σ−i, βi, τ
σ
t )(t) =
∑
t−i∈T−i,b∈A−i
βi(t)(t−i) · σ−i(t−i)(b) · ui(t, t−i, a, b, τ
σ
t (t, t−i, a))
= p
as desired.
For any strategy profile σ and player i fix the perception τσi defined as
τσi (t, t−i, a)
def
= τσt (t, t−i, a) for every t ∈ Ti, t−i ∈ T−i and a ∈ Ai satisfying
Ui(σ
a, σi, βi, τ
σ
i )(t) = Ui(σ
a′ , σi, βi, τ
σ
i )(t) for all a, a
′ ∈ Bσt . Such a perception
is guaranteed to exist by Claim 2. Define the following correspondence BRit:
BRit(σ) = arg max
µ∈∆(Ai)
{Ui (µ, σ−i, βi, τ
σ
i ) (t)} .
Claim 3 BRit(σ) is nonempty and convex for every σ = (σ1, σ2), where σi :
Ti → Ai.
Proof: Observe that for any σ′(t), σ′′(t) ∈ ∆(A), a fixed perception τσ, and
λ ∈ (0, 1), it holds that
Ui (λσ
′(t) + (1− λ)σ′′(t), σ−i, βi, τ
σ) (t)
= λUi (σ
′(t), σ−i, βi, τ
σ) (t) + (1− λ)Ui (σ
′′(t), σ−i, βi, τ
σ) (t).
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In particular, this implies that Ui is concave in its first argument, which in
turn implies that the set BRit(σ) is nonempty and convex for every σ.
Consider the following correspondence defined by
BˆR
σ−i
t (ν) = arg max
σ′(t)∈∆(A)
{Ui (σ
′(t), σ−i, βi, ν) (t)} .
Note in particular that BˆR
σ−i
t (τ
σ
i ) = BR
i
t(σ). As with BRt(σ), the set
BˆRt(ν) is also nonempty and convex.
Claim 4 If µt ∈ T
σ
t and a ∈ BˆR
σ−i
t (µt), then a ∈ BR
i
t(σ).
Proof: The conditions in the claim directly imply that a ∈ Bσt . By
Claim 3 there exists some b ∈ BRit(σ). Note that this implies that b ∈ B
σ
t .
By construction, since both a and b are in Bσt , it must be the case that
Ui(σ
a, σ−i, βi, τ
σ
i )(t) = Ui(σ
b, σ−i, βi, τ
σ
i )(t). But b ∈ BR
i
t(σ) then implies that
a ∈ BRit(σ).
Lemma 1 BRit(σ) is upper-hemicontinous.
Proof: Fix a sequence σn → σ with a ∈ BRit(σ
n) for all n. Due to the
convexity of BRit(σ) guaranteed by Claim 3, a sufficient condition for upper-
hemicontinuity is that a ∈ BRit(σ).
Let n be sufficiently large to guarantee that for all t−i ∈ T−i,
{a ∈ ∪t˜i∈supp(β−i(t−i))supp(σi(t˜i))} ⊆ {a ∈ ∪t˜i∈supp(β−i(t−i))supp(σ
n
i (t˜i))}.
This is possible, since the action set is finite and so the support set for σn
must be equal that of σ for large enough n. Consider the sequence of player i
perceptions
{
τσ
n
i
}
n≥1
. By Bolzano–Weierstrass, this sequence has a convergent
subsequence
{
τσ
m
i
}
m≥1
, where
qt
def
= lim
m→∞
τσ
m
i .
Observe that since τσ
m
i ∈ T
σn
t for all m, by the assumption of n being large
enough it must be the case that qt ∈ T
σ
t . Since a ∈ BˆR
σ−i
t (τ
σm
t ), by continuity
a ∈ BˆR
σ−i
t (qt). But then Claim 4 implies that a ∈ BR
i
t(σ), as required.
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We are finally ready to prove Proposition 1:
Proof: By Lemma 1, BRit(σ) is upper-hemicontinuous. This implies that the
correspondence BR defined as BR(σ) =
{
BRiti(σ)
}
i∈{1,2},ti∈Ti
, is also convex-
valued and upper-hemicontinuous, so by Kakutani’s theorem a fixed point σ∗
exists. It is easy to verify that (σ∗, τσ
∗
1 , τ
σ∗
2 ) is a perception equilibrium.
D Continuity is necessary for equilibrium ex-
istence
The following example of a single-player perception game is a (quite artificial)
variant of Example 1 which violates Assumption 1 and has no perception
equilibrium.
Example 4 The active player, Alice, is of type t ∈ {ℓ, r} with β(1) = β(0) =
0.5, and must choose between actions {L,R}, with a utility of 1 if t = a
(the uppercase of the type is equal to the action) and 0 otherwise. However,
suppose that Alice incurs an additional disutility as follows. Let p ∈ [0, 1]
denote the probability that the inactive player assigns to Alice type r. Then
both types incur a disutility of −2 whenever p = 0.5, type r incurs a disutility
of −2 when p = 1, and type ℓ incurs a disutility of −2 whenever p = 0. The
disutility is 0 otherwise.
For any pure and separating strategy profile, both players obtain a utility
of at most 1 − 2, whereas a deviation would yield 0 and is hence profitable.
Suppose the strategy profile is pure and pooling, with both types playing L.
Then type ℓ obtains utility −1, and type r obtains utility −2. But regardless
of the perception under action r, type r will strictly benefit from deviating.
Finally, as in Example 1, no mixed strategy can be optimal.
Although a proper definition is not given, there is no ε-perception equilibrium
in this example for any small enough ε.
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Note that the utility functions in the example, while not continuous in
the last argument, are lower semicontinuous, and so a weaker assumption
to that effect does not suffice for equilibrium existence. To see that upper
semicontinuity alone is also not sufficient, modify the payoffs of the example
above as follows: Fix a small ε > 0, and suppose both types incur a disutility
of −2 whenever p ∈ (.5 − ε, .5 + ε), type r incurs a disutility of −2 when
p > 1− ε, and type ℓ incurs a disutility of −2 whenever p < ε. As above, the
disutility is 0 otherwise. With these modifications, the utility functions are
upper semicontinuous. However, the same argument for lack of an equilibrium
as in the example still goes through.
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